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Bolivia
ANAÏD FLESKEN
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Bristol, UK
ABSTRACT. Research on the effects of ethnic politics abounds, but much less atten-
tion has been paid to where and why ethnic parties form. This article tests the
explanatory power of rational-choice and social-movement informed approaches to
ethnic party formation that, it argues, differ in their assumptions about the location
of agency (elite vs. grassroots) and motives for party formation (ofﬁce- vs. policy-
seeking). The assumptions are tested through an analysis of original data on party
registration and socio-economic factors in 327 Bolivian municipalities during the
2004 local elections. The elections took place under new electoral rules during a period
of political restructuring, allowing an analysis of party entry decisions per se. Through a
series of logistic regression models and various robustness checks, this article ﬁnds that
social-movement approaches are better able to explain ethnic party formation, and in
particular that grievances over political maladministration and socio-economic inequal-
ities drive ethnic party formation.
KEYWORDS: Bolivia, ethnicity, party formation, political parties
Introduction
Why do ethnic parties form? Particularly in new, unconsolidated democracies,
ethnic cleavages are feared to be politicised in the form of ethnic parties,
polarising ethnic relations and endangering political stability (e.g. Brancati
2006; Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). But while research on
the effects of ethnic politics abounds, much less attention has been paid to
where and why ethnic cleavages translate into party politics: not everywhere
where there is ethnic diversity are there ethnic parties. The party system litera-
ture sees ethnic diversity as driver of party system fragmentation more gener-
ally, but studies tend to focus on consolidated democracies and rarely go
beyond establishing a correlation between the number of ethnic groups and
the number of parties in general (e.g. Clark and Golder 2006; Lago Penas
2004). Research on new party formation, too, concentrates on established
party systems of Western democracies and cannot be directly translated to de-
veloping democracies, where the probability of ethnic parties is thought to be
the highest (e.g. Lago and Martínez 2011; Tavits 2006). Research on elections
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in diverse societies, in contrast, focuses mainly on ethnic voting rather than
ethnic party emergence (e.g. Conroy-Kurtz 2012; Ferree 2011; Huber 2012).
And while Chandra (2004) and Birnir (2007) made important advances in
the study of ethnic parties, their empirical analyses, too, centre on party
performance.
Reasons to study ethnic party emergence abound. Some new parties, even if
starting out small, are there to stay, and hence considerably affect the party
system in which they appear. Even if they remain small, their sheer presence
may affect electoral competition regarding both the topics on the political
agenda and the voting behaviour of citizens (Hug 2001). When mobilising
around ethnicity, the impact of new parties may be even stronger, considering
the supposed ‘stickiness’ of ethnicity and the strong feelings it engenders
among politicians and voters alike (Horowitz 1985).
This article hence examines the question why ethnic parties form. It argues
that current research into ethnic parties can be distinguished as instrumentally
or social-movement driven, with important differences in two dimensions: ﬁrst,
the two approaches differ regarding the location of agency, with the ﬁrst
assigning agency to individual ethnic entrepreneurs and the latter to collective
grassroots actors. Second, they differ regarding the motives assumed to be
behind political mobilisation. The instrumental approach emphasises the
ofﬁce-seeking incentives for individual actors, while the social-movement
approach focuses on policy-seeking incentives to address collective grievances.
While both approaches are common in the literature, they are rarely
contrasted theoretically and have, to the best of my knowledge, never been
tested against each other empirically.
I conduct such a test in the context of Bolivian local politics. Focusing on
local elections allows examining ethnic party formation directly at the level
where it is being said to occur. As an additional beneﬁt, the analysis of munic-
ipal elections allows accounting for spatial variation in constituencies that
tends to be overlooked in cross-country studies with aggregate data. This is
especially important in newer, unconsolidated democracies, where levels of
socio-economic development and state reach – both linked to ethnic party
formation – are likely to be uneven.
The Bolivian context is a particularly interesting one for this purpose. Since
the 1990s, ethnicity has become increasingly politicised, and by 2002, two
parties – the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS, Movement toward Socialism)
and the Movimiento Indígena Pachakutik (MIP, Indigenous Movement
Pachakutik) – emphasised indigenous matters in the presidential elections. It
was in this context of ethnic politicisation that the 2004 municipal elections
took place under a new set of electoral rules, which opened the political arena
to new political actors and allowed the formation of a vast number of new
parties, both ethnic and non-ethnic. Methodologically, this ‘tabula rasa’ makes
it possible to examine ethnic party entry decisions itself, instead of longer-term
trajectories that usually need to be disentangled to arrive at inferences on
agency. Lack of comprehensive empirical data has so far inhibited the
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quantitative, spatially disaggregated analysis of the relation between local con-
texts and ethnic party formation. To ﬁll this gap, I use new municipal-level
data on party registration, socio-economic factors and demographic differ-
ences in 327 Bolivian municipalities.
Through a series of logistic regression models and various robustness
checks, I document that a variety of factors contribute to ethnic party forma-
tion, but that political calculations of individual ethnic entrepreneurs are not
likely to be one of them: neither electoral strategy nor ofﬁce-seeking incentives
affect the probability of ethnic party formation. Instead of greed, grievances
with the current administration are driving ethnic party formation, over and
above ethnic group size and other contextual factors like the population size
of the polity. Overall, the ﬁndings suggest that individual leaders have a stron-
ger agency in party formation than often assumed in social-movement
approaches, but that they are not as strongly driven by their own individual
interests as often assumed in instrumental approaches. With this ﬁnding, the
paper contributes to the broader literature on ethnic mobilisation.
The following section ﬁrst speciﬁes the instrumental and social-movement
approaches to ethnic party formation, with emphasis on differences regarding
the ethnic target group and motives for party formation. The next section pro-
vides background on the Bolivian context and outlines its suitability as a plau-
sibility probe for the two approaches. The paper then operationalises the
factors outlined above and presents the results. The conclusion discusses the
ﬁndings in the light of the theory and lists limitations, as well as directions
for future research.
Ethnic party formation
Research on ethnic party formation is sparse. To date, the literature on ethnic
parties has focused mainly on their strategies once formed (Bochsler and
Szöcsik 2013; Zuber 2013); their success (Chandra 2004; Madrid 2012); and
their inﬂuence on ethnic relations and conﬂict (Birnir 2007; Ishiyama 2009).
Yet most such studies are informed by assumptions on why ethnic parties
form, making an empirical analysis of the dynamics of formation imperative.
Notably, the literature on ethnic party success often assigns the same explana-
tory factors to party emergence as it does to success, even though the two
processes are distinct in practice: explaining success requires considering not
only party or elite behaviour but also that of voters (Hug 2001), and voting
behaviour in turn is affected by the parties on offer. Focusing on ethnic party
success alone also introduces the question of selection bias, since only those
parties may form for which there is indeed a demand (Bernauer and Bochsler
2011). The present paper hence examines the supply side of ethnic parties, that
is, party formation, in more detail. Party formation is here deﬁned as ﬁrst-time
entry to an electoral competition, and in the following party entry and forma-
tion are used synonymously.
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Corresponding to the focus on formation, I use a minimal deﬁnition of eth-
nic parties, according to which a party is ethnic if it explicitly appeals to a spe-
ciﬁc population group united by an ethnic attribute – rather than, for example,
if it attains the majority of votes from speciﬁc ethnic groups (see e.g. Chandra
2011; Horowitz 1985). While ethnic appeals may also be implicit or covert, for
instance, due to social norms or political regulations (Chandra 2011; Ishiyama
and Breuning 2011), explicit appeals are those referred to most often in the
existing theories on ethnic parties, as discussed next. Moreover, Bolivia, where
the theories are tested, does not show spatial variation regarding norms or
regulations that would systematically affect the existence of explicit appeals,
making the latter appropriate to use as deﬁning factor of ethnic parties.
Research on ethnic parties approaches the issue of party formation from
either of two directions. On the one hand, we have instrumental accounts inﬂu-
enced by formal models of party entry in rational choice approaches, most
fully developed by Cox (1997; see also Hug 2001; Tavits 2006). According to
instrumental accounts, party entry is the result of a strategic decision taken
by rational actors to obtain the beneﬁts associated with holding ofﬁce. Ratio-
nal actors only decide to enter the fray, and hence to bear the costs associated
with registering and campaigning, if they think that they are likely to win
enough votes to enter ofﬁce. Accordingly, political actors also only form ethnic
parties – rather than a non-ethnic party or no party at all – if they perceive a
chance of winning based on this cleavage.
This argument assumes that it is clear at the time of entry which party or
issue is viable on election day. While Cox (1997) argues that the assumption
does not hold, by deﬁnition, in situations of uncertainty as in early elections,
scholars of ethnic parties maintain that it is exactly in these situations that
ethnicity is used as basis for party formation. Precisely because there is no
information on the viability of parties according to their policy positions, can-
didates tend to campaign on the basis of their personal attributes to attract
voters of similar backgrounds (Moser 1999; Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich
2003). Drawing on theories of political learning and information shortcuts,
these studies theorise that, in low-information settings, ethnic cues are readily
available sources of information and may be strategically emphasised by poli-
ticians to guide the political choice of voters (Birnir 2007; Chandra 2004).
Ethnic cleavages do not translate ‘automatically’ into politics: from a reper-
toire of cleavage dimensions like region, religion, language or skin colour,
politicians tend to emphasise that dimension that promises the necessary
number of votes to win ofﬁce (Chandra 2004; Posner 2005).1
On the other hand, there are approaches to ethnic party formation that
align with social-movement theory. The mobilisation of new political
demands, whether through parties or movements, has often been explained
by the opportunities and organisational capacity available for mobilisation
to address an underlying dissatisfaction with the status quo (Eisinger 1973;
Kitschelt 1986). These studies, too, assign a role to political actors taking the
conscious decision to form a party; however, this decision is seen to be more
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strongly inﬂuenced by the political structures in which the actors ﬁnd them-
selves (Morris and Staggenborg 2006). Moreover, in these approaches, the
actors form parties to seek policies addressing collective, rather than their
own, individual interests. That is, (ethnic) party formation is much more a
bottom-up rather than top-down process (e.g. Rice and van Cott 2006; van
Cott 2005).
This is not to say that the distinction between the two approaches is always
clear cut (see Opp 2009). It is hence not surprising that their different concepts
are often measured with similar indicators or that both have been extended
with similar arguments, such as political learning. However, both approaches
have different underlying assumptions, with different implications for what we
would have to observe if ethnic parties were formed either by instrumentally
driven, ofﬁce-seeking or by collective-interest driven, policy-seeking political
actors. It is hence worth spelling out the differences in more detail. In particu-
lar, the two approaches have different implications with regard to their
motives, ethnic group size and institutional permissiveness.
Motives
One observable difference between instrumental and social-movement
approaches lies in the incentive structure for party formation. According to
the former, politicians are instrumentally rational and driven by the ﬁnancial
rewards and prestige that come with political ofﬁce (Tavits 2006). In new de-
mocracies in particular, patronage expectations are anticipated to structure
incentives (Allen 2012; Chandra 2004). Accordingly, the probability of enter-
ing an electoral race, either with an ethnic or a non-ethnic party, should be
higher the more personal gain politicians expect to derive through such
practices.
Social-movement approaches, in contrast, see collective grievances of the
ethnic group vis-à-vis the traditional elites as driving force for party formation,
as it is these grievances that are to be addressed once in power. That is, parties
are primarily policy-seeking rather than ofﬁce-seeking. Such grievances may
include socio-economic inequalities but also political or cultural
marginalisation (Bilinski 2015; van Cott 2005). That is, here, we would expect
to see a higher incidence of ethnic parties where there is more dissatisfaction
with the current system.
Ethnic group size
An important factor in both approaches is the population share of the ethnic
group that is targeted by the party. Social-movement approaches see the ethnic
group’s population share as an indicator for the pool of potential electoral can-
didates and their organisational backing. That is, the larger the ethnic group,
the more likely the presence of dedicated individuals to mobilise politically,
and the more likely their collective support. This is not just a numbers game:
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ethnic group size itself is of little use where the group’s organisational capacity
is limited, and vice versa. For example, indigenous parties emerged in
Colombia despite the country’s miniscule indigenous population of less than
3 per cent, while they did not emerge in Peru, which has an indigenous popu-
lation share of almost 40 per cent, but in which organisational structures are
only weakly developed (van Cott 2005). However, quantitative analyses do
include indigenous population share as indicator of organisational capacity,
with the hypothesis that the higher the share, the higher the chances for party
emergence (Birnir 2004; Rice and van Cott 2006).
In instrumental approaches, in contrast, the ethnic group share is important
as pool of voters rather than of candidates. This is expressed in the
information-shortcut hypothesis that states that political entrepreneurs use
ethnic traits in the voting population to conduct a head count to see whether
they would attain sufﬁcient votes for ofﬁce. That is, this literature sees the
political entrepreneur as strategic in the sense that she may also mobilise in
non-ethnic terms if the demographic variation on the ground is not fruitful
for ethnic mobilisation (Chandra 2004; Posner 2005). Where ethnic group
share is the pool of potential voters, the relationship between voters and ethnic
party emergence is not linear: ethnic parties would only form in constituencies
when the ethnic group share passes a certain threshold after which entering
ofﬁce is virtually guaranteed. But ethnic parties would also not form in constit-
uencies with very high ethnic group shares, since then the utility of ethnic traits
to differentiate between voters vanishes (Chandra 2004).
Institutional permissiveness
The permissiveness of the institutional system also plays a role in both
approaches. Particularly the electoral system is identiﬁed as limiting factor.
In instrumental approaches, actors’ strategic calculations depend not only on
the pool of potential voters but also on the number of voters needed to enter
ofﬁce. That is, electoral institutions do not only distribute votes into seats
following the elections (mechanical effect), but work even before the elections
take place, by shaping party and voter strategies in anticipation of the institu-
tions’ mechanical effect (psychological effect) (Clark and Golder 2006;
Duverger 1954). In districts with a small number of seats, and hence a high
number of necessary votes and low probability of winning a seat, the incentives
are higher to form broader alliances rather than to enter an individual party. In
districts with a larger number of seats available, in contrast, more parties are
potentially viable and even minority groups may feel encouraged to register
their own party to attain representation (Cox 1997). This ‘anticipated strategic
voting’ hypothesis has received considerable empirical support from cross-
country comparative studies in consolidated democracies, which shows that
party system fragmentation is the product of an interaction between ethnic
fractionalisation as measure of diversity and average district magnitude as
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measure of electoral permissiveness (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Clark and
Golder 2006).
In social-movement approaches, too, institutional permissiveness in the
form of registration costs or electoral thresholds affects party formation, but
here, not so much in altering actors’ strategic choices but in hindering the
registration of parties as well as their electoral success after the decision to
run has been made. van Cott (2005) makes institutional permissiveness an
important part of her explanation of ethnic party emergence in Latin
America (also Birnir 2004, but see Madrid 2012).
In summary, then, we can formulate two expectations. First, the instrumen-
tal approach leads us to expect ethnic party formation where both the material or
symbolic incentives for holding ofﬁce and the probability of winning ofﬁce are
perceived to be high. The latter depends on the extent to which the ethnic group
size aligns with the vote count necessary to win ofﬁce. Second, the social-
movement approach leads us to expect that the probability of ethnic party forma-
tion increases with ethnic group size and with the degree of collective grievances
and institutional permissiveness. In the following, the two hypotheses are tested
with ethnic party entry in the 2004 Bolivian municipal elections.
Ethnic parties in Bolivia
Bolivia is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in Latin America.
Shortly before the 2004 elections, around 62 per cent of the population identi-
ﬁed themselves in the national census as belonging to one of the country’s now
thirty-ﬁve recognised indigenous peoples (Bolivia 2001). Bolivia is also one of
the most unequal countries in Latin America, and indigenous origin and socio-
economic status are closely linked: the indigenous population fares consis-
tently worse in land ownership, poverty, malnutrition or infant mortality
(CERD 2006; ECLAC 2006). But despite this inequality, ethnicity has only
recently begun to play a role in electoral mobilisation, with ﬁrst attempts in
the 1970s and more assertive mobilisation from the 1990s onwards (van Cott
2005; Weber, Hiers, and Flesken 2016; Yashar 2005). During the 2002 presi-
dential elections, the young party MAS, arising from the coca farmers’ move-
ment in the Bolivian countryside, made indigeneity a salient issue, and the
party’s leader Evo Morales gained a surprising 20.9 per cent of the vote. Less
successful but nevertheless present and active was the MIP led by Felipe
Quispe Huanca, which, as the party name suggests, puts an even stronger
emphasis than the MAS on indigenous issues (Albó 2002; Singer and Morrison
2004).
Yet before the 1990s, party formation around indigenous identity was rare
and not electorally viable; ethnic cleavages in Latin America had not trans-
lated into ethnic parties. Instead, indigenous Bolivians were linked either to
traditional parties through patron–client relations; to leftist parties that di-
rectly appealed to (but rarely represented) indigenous interests; or to populist
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parties that appealed to indigenous Bolivians’ class background against their
common opponent in the form of the ruling elite (Rice and van Cott 2006).
The change from this situation to one of indigenous political mobilisation is of-
ten attributed to the possibility of strong local movements to use the opportu-
nity of a political opening accorded by institutional reforms in the 1990s.
Yashar (2005) suggests that the combination of political and economic
liberalisation and pre-existing social networks triggered the politicisation of
indigeneity in the Andes. van Cott (2005) focuses more strongly on the role
of the political institutional environment, like the degree of decentralisation
and ballot access or the presence of reserved seats, but also stresses the impor-
tance of community-level organisational structures and strategic political ac-
tors to use political opportunities. However, while these and similar accounts
recognise that organisational capacity differs in space, the empirical explora-
tion is limited to the differences between the two major geographic areas in
the region: the Andean highlands and the Amazonian lowlands. Further explo-
ration has so far been hampered by lack of suitable sub-national data indicat-
ing organisational capacity (Rice and van Cott 2006). Previous studies were
therefore not able to explain why ethnic parties form only in some municipal-
ities but not others.
An analysis of the 2004 municipal elections accords us that opportunity.
Prior to the elections, electoral reforms further opened the political arena to
new political actors. The electoral law now, for the ﬁrst time, allowed citizens’
associations and indigenous peoples to compete in elections alongside
national, traditional parties.2 Low registration hurdles – requiring signatures
equivalent to only 2 per cent of the valid votes in the previous elections, or
at least ﬁve signatures (Bolivia 2004a) – ensured that this opening did not just
exist on paper alone. Moreover, the preceding general elections of 2002 amid
an anti-neoliberal protest wave had dealt a blow to the traditional parties
and increased the visibility of indigenous political organisations (Singer and
Morrison 2004), which both increased the incentives for new (indigenous)
actors to compete in the local elections.
The 2004 municipal elections present a useful opportunity for three reasons.
First, with such drastic changes in the political environment, it is possible to
consider them as relatively independent from previous elections, and hence
to study spatial differences in party formation itself rather than, say, their
continued success. This context, a low-information setting in which the utility
of ethnic mobilisation was becoming increasingly clear, allows focusing on
whether actors decide to enter the electoral race and whether they do so by
emphasising ethnicity.
Second, the Bolivian socio-economic and political environment makes it an
ideal context to probe the plausibility of the instrumental and social-movement
approaches: ethnically structured inequalities together with a history of politi-
cal patronage and of strong social movements make Bolivia a ‘most-likely’
context for both explanations, and any absence of evidence for either link
particularly telling.3
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Third, examining sub-national, rather than cross-country variation,
addresses several methodological problems usually faced in the examination
of party entry. It allows testing the effect of electoral permissiveness directly
at the district level where it occurs (Cox 1997) and avoiding the endogeneity
problem between the electoral system and the nature of the existing party sys-
tem (Benoit 2002): municipal-level electoral rules are dictated by the state, and
hence independent of the local party system. This has the added beneﬁt that
electoral rules do not vary aside from the district magnitude, which makes it
easier to trace its effect. Last, sub-national units of analysis are also better
comparable with regard to data on ethnicity since they rely on only one source,
which further reduces non-random measurement error (Jones 1997).
The data
This paper uses an original compilation of municipal-level data on party regis-
tration, socio-economic factors and demographic differences in 327 municipal-
ities for the 2004 elections. The following presents the measurement of the
dependent variable (ethnic party entry) and of party motives, ethnic group size
and institutional permissiveness, as well as of control variables (compare
Table 1).
Ethnic party entry
The dependent variable indicates the entry of an ethnic party into the electoral
race. Entry refers to the registration of the party for competition, as recorded
by the Bolivian electoral court (Bolivia 2004b). I use this minimal deﬁnition of
entry rather than a minimum vote count since the focus of analysis is on orga-
nisations’ decision to enter the race. This is a priori unrelated to its perfor-
mance, particularly so in an open political context during which many
organisations form and enter for the ﬁrst time. In the 327 municipalities exam-
ined here, 419 different political organisations entered the elections, made up
of 21 traditional parties, 58 indigenous peoples and 340 citizens’ associations.
The number of organisations per municipality ranges from one to twenty-one.
A party was coded as ethnic party if it explicitly mobilises around ethnicity,
by i) registering as representing an indigenous people, ii) explicitly referring to
indigeneity in its name or iii) using an indigenous-language name. Following
the identiﬁcation of ethnic parties, it was further necessary to assign them to
the speciﬁc ethnic group they claim to represent, to be able to see whether eth-
nic group characteristics like size would make a difference. Although the
Bolivian constitution of 2009 recognises thirty-ﬁve indigenous peoples, the
highland–lowland distinction is the most salient division in both politics and
society (Flesken 2013; van Cott 2005), and I hence categorised parties into
highland and lowland indigenous parties. For this, it is possible to use candi-
dates’ surnames as categorising device since they signal ethnic group
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membership even where other information is not available (Chandra 2004;
Dunning and Harrison 2010). In Bolivia, the most common indigenous
languages in the highlands, Aymara and Quechua, are phonologically similar
and can be distinguished from the languages spoken among Amazonian
lowland indigenous peoples, like Guaraní or Mojeño (Cerrón-Palomino
2015). With the assistance of a Bolivian linguist, I distinguished ethnic parties
accordingly based on the linguistic background of the highest-ranked candi-
date’s surnames on the party list, as it was this name that appeared on the
ballots, visible to voters on election day. We coded surnames with discernibly
Aymara or Quechua roots, like Condori or Mamani, as highland and
surnames with roots from Amazonian indigenous languages, like Bejarano
or Mayja, as lowland indigenous. Where candidates of indigenous organisa-
tions had surnames of Castilian origin, like Cruz or Lopez, I judged the ethnic
background of the organisation based on i) the surnames of the lower ranked
candidates on the list, ii) descriptors or language of the party name itself or iii)
in-depth case knowledge.
The lowland and highland indigenous populations do not, despite their
designations, live in separate parts of the country; in a regression design, ethnic
party formation could therefore be attributed to either the highland or the low-
land indigenous population, or to both. Since the number of lowland people
and parties is small, I restrict the analysis to those of the highlands, but note
that the models provide substantively similar results even without the differen-
tiation between highland and lowland. In total, eighty different highland indig-
enous parties entered the elections in 156 municipalities, ranging from one to
ﬁve organisations per municipality. As the distribution of highland indigenous
parties is skewed across municipalities – with more than two ethnic parties in
only three municipalities – it does not allow for meaningful analysis of party
counts with Poisson regression. Instead, I recoded the data into a binary indi-
cator for the presence or absence of ethnic parties.
The role of the MAS and the MIP
In the Bolivian context, special consideration is merited by the parties MAS
and, perhaps to a lesser extent, MIP.4 Owing to their emphasis on indigenous
issues, both parties were, at the time of the municipal election, ethnic parties.
However, the focus of this paper is the new formation of ethnic parties, and
by then, both MAS and MIP had already been present and built supra-local
organisational frameworks. That also means that, despite the parties’ grass-
roots nature, the decision to enter the different municipal elections was not
made by local but by national actors (Do Alto 2008). The MAS was present
in all but 31 municipalities, and the MIP still in 123 municipalities. Their inclu-
sion into the dependent variable thus does not make sense for theoretical nor
methodological reasons, since there is little spatial variation in their
registrations.
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Yet, the presence of two country-wide parties that would also ﬁeld candi-
dates in the municipal elections could affect political entrepreneurs’ consider-
ations of whether to form an(other) ethnic party. On the one hand, local
ethnic parties may be crowded out: where local actors perceive that ethnic
rhetoric has already been used successfully, they may decide against forming
a party or at least against using ethnicity as politicised cleavage. On the other
hand, local actors may have learnt from previous MAS or MIP success and
now try to imitate their political rhetoric. Imitation as a factor in new party
formation has been observed elsewhere (Erlingsson 2008), and the MAS itself
has been argued to have learnt from ethnic mobilisation attempts in the past
and in neighbouring countries (van Cott 2005). I hence account for prior
success of the MAS and MIP by including their 2002 vote share as control
variable.5 A positive relation with the probability of ethnic party presence in
a municipality would support the imitation hypothesis, while a negative rela-
tion would suggest a crowding-out effect.
Ethnic group size and institutional permissiveness
To account for an ethnic party’s potential support base, I use the share of the
highland indigenous population. Ethnic group shares are measured according
to the number of people per municipality identifying themselves in the national
census of 2001 as belonging to either the Aymara or Quechua highland
indigenous population (Bolivia 2001). The census data on indigenous self-
identiﬁcation has been criticised for overestimating the number of indigenous
Bolivians, largely due to the lack of a ‘mestizo’ (mixed) response category
(Toranzo Roca 2008).6 Alternative measures of ethnicity, such as language
skills, however, may have the opposite problem of underestimating the indig-
enous population size: not everybody identifying as indigenous – and hence
potentially mobilising as indigenous – may have learned to speak an indige-
nous language during childhood, particularly where, as in Latin America,
doing so has tended to limit social mobility (Garcia 2003). Self-identiﬁcation
catches best the availability of ethnicity as mobilisational tool at the individual
level (see also Mähler and Pierskalla 2015), and there is no reason to suspect
that overestimation varies systematically by municipality. The highland indig-
enous population shares ranges from under 1 to 100 per cent per municipality.
Following the theoretical discussion, the effect of ethnic group size depends
on the institutional context, with different logics in the social-movement and
the instrumental approach. In the former, highland indigenous population
share is included as such since the probability of party formation increases with
group size. A potential limiting factor in this regard is here only the permissive-
ness of the institutional environment, that is, whether the group is large enough
to vote their candidates into ofﬁce. To account for this, I also include a binary
indicator ‘sufﬁcient indigenous’ into the model, with 1 indicating that the in-
digenous population is larger than the population share needed to vote one
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candidate into ofﬁce, which in turn is a function of the total population and the
district magnitude in each municipality.
In the instrumental approach, group size is also important to the extent to
which the group share is equal to or larger than the vote share required, but
here, the size of the majority is decisive. I therefore include a continuous indi-
cator ‘indigenous majority’ that captures this relation by subtracting from the
indigenous population size that needed to obtain a seat.7 According to the
instrumental approach, the utility of ethnicity as mobilisational base, and
hence the probability of ethnic party presence, follows an inverted U-shaped
function: while the probability increases with ethnic group size, it decreases
again where the group has such a vast majority that ethnic traits cannot serve
as marker of difference anymore. To model this curve, I include both its value
as well as its square. If the distribution is as expected, the ﬁrst should be signif-
icantly positive and the latter signiﬁcantly negative.
Motives
I also account for the motives for running for ofﬁce. In social-movement
approaches, motives for party formation are grievances with the current
administration, which are to be addressed through new sets of policies.
Grievances with the current administration are here understood in two ways:
through levels of social vulnerability and of municipal maladministration.
The social vulnerability index (SVI) measures differences in levels of develop-
ment, including levels of education, health, demographic structure and hous-
ing (Bolivia 2009).8 In the Bolivian context, it is particularly important to
include this indicator because the indigenous population tends to live in the
less developed regions of the country. Low numbers indicate low levels of
social vulnerability, that is, grievances should be relatively low.
Municipal administration is composed of three indices provided by the
Ministry for Autonomy (Bolivia 2010). First, the efﬁcacy index refers to the
degree to which each municipal government uses its resources efﬁciently in
the provision of public services, and hence the absence of waste and corrup-
tion, as indicated by a municipality’s spending efﬁciency, ﬁscal effort, ﬁnancial
independence and investment per capita.9 Second, I measure administration
through the degree of municipal accountability to the national government,
that is, compliance with administrative-legal formalities as indicated by the
number of cases of frozen accounts and the delivery of annual operational
plans and of budget reports. Finally, an index of control processes shows
whether municipalities have in place audit processes and procedures to handle
cases of embezzlement or mismanagement of funds. As the efﬁcacy, account-
ability and control indices increase, the better the municipal administration.
To build a grievances index together with social vulnerability, I reverse their
coding to indicate maladministration, rescale all variables to the same scale,
multiply each with their factor loading from a factor analysis and add them
together.
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In instrumental approaches, in contrast, the incentive for party formation is
not policy change but the ofﬁce itself and its associated beneﬁts. One indicator
for the prestige of ofﬁce and of the control over resources that comes with it is
the amount of revenues transferred to the municipal governments from the
central state, as reported by the Ministry of Natural Resources (Bolivia
2012b).10 The allocated revenues per capita range from BOB$ 141.4 to 2,427
across municipalities. As alternative indicators for beneﬁts of ofﬁce, I also
include a measure of local councillors’ salary as well as total municipal income
and assets in robustness checks.
Population size
Finally, I control for the population size of municipalities. For the instrumen-
tal approach, Chandra (2004) points out that the size of the constituency may
alter its information environment, and hence the utility of ethnicity as
mobilisational tool: in municipalities with as little as 221 inhabitants, who
likely know each other by sight, ethnicity is not as useful as an information
shortcut as in larger municipalities with as many as 1.14 million inhabitants.
For the social-movement approach, population size is often taken to indicate
organisational capacity: large, urban municipalities have a better infrastruc-
ture that may more easily lend itself to political mobilisation, whereas in small,
rural municipalities, the costs of forming, competing and possibly working for
a political organisation may be too high.
As an alternative measure for political organisation, I also include a new
measure of popular participation reported by the Ministry of Autonomy
(Bolivia 2010). Besides voter turnout, the number of women in councils and
local participation in associations of municipalities (mancomunidades), this
measure also includes the number of territorial organisations (organizaciones
territoriales de base, OTB) per municipality. This indicates the strength of
grassroots organisations in peasant, indigenous and urban neighbourhood
committees (Altman and Lalander 2003).
Results
I use logistic regression analysis to estimate the explanatory power of the dif-
ferent factors for the presence or absence of ethnic parties. To do so, I test
the two theories against each other by specifying and running two different
models and comparing their ﬁt to the data. This approach was chosen over
that of specifying a single, omnibus model with variables from both theories
since the preceding discussion has shown that although the two approaches
consider similar factors to matter, they matter in different ways – for example,
compare how ethnic group size and district magnitude are assumed to relate to
each other. A single model would be atheoretical, conﬂating the different
explanations and likely impairing the precision of estimates (Achen 2005;
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Clarke 2001). Table 2 thus presents the results of two binary logistic regres-
sions for the probability of ethnic party presence as well as of a Vuong close-
ness test to statistically compare model ﬁts (Vuong 1989).11
The instrumental model includes ofﬁce-seeking incentives and the size of the
indigenous majority as explanatory variables, controlling for ﬁrst-mover
success with the inclusion of MAS and MIP votes. Here, the only signiﬁcant
factor is the share of MIP votes in the previous elections. As the coefﬁcient is
positive, this suggests imitation rather than crowding out.12 Beneﬁts connected
to ofﬁce and the squared indigenous majority, in contrast, are insigniﬁcant.
When running the same model without the squared term (not reported) – that
is, with only the size of the indigenous majority – the latter becomes signiﬁ-
cantly positive, but municipal resources are still no incentive to form an ethnic
party. Moreover, despite the now signiﬁcant indigenous majority term, this
model does not provide a signiﬁcantly better ﬁt than the former.
Yet, model ﬁt is signiﬁcantly better for the social-movement model
(Vuong’s p = 0.018). Besides MAS and MIP votes, this model includes the
highland indigenous population share, a binary indicator for whether this
share is larger than the vote share needed to attain a seat, population size,
grievances and the population’s participation. Here, neither MIP nor MAS
success in the past play a role. Instead, the indigenous population share is
signiﬁcantly positive, as expected: the larger the indigenous population, the
higher the probability that an ethnic party emerges.
Table 2. Determinants of ethnic party presence
Variable Instrumental model Movement model
Constant 5.233 (1.515)*** 11.685 (2.452)***
MAS votes 2002 0.004 (0.011) 0.012 (0.012)
MIP votes 2002 0.024 (0.011)* 0.019 (0.011)
ln(population) 0.189 (0.133) 0.493 (0.157)**
Indigenous majority 3.309 (2.968)
Indigenous majority 2 0.278 (2.584)
Revenues per capita 0.00002 (0.133)
Indigenous 4.332 (1.494)**
Sufﬁcient indigenous 1.601 (1.284)
Grievances 5.331 (2.029)**
Participation 0.023 (0.018)
AIC 314.72 298.25
Vuong’s p (AIC corrected) 0.018
Note: n = 321, robust standard errors in parentheses; MAS, Movimiento al Socialismo;
MIP, Movimiento Indígena Pachakutik; AIC, Akaike Information Criterion;
*signiﬁcant at 5%,
**at 1%,
***at 0.1%.
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Further signiﬁcant factors are population size and grievances. First, the
population size is signiﬁcantly positive. That is, the larger the municipality,
the more likely that an ethnic party emerges. This ﬁnding contradicts qualita-
tive studies on Latin America that lead to expect that indigenous parties are
more likely to emerge in rural, and hence smaller municipalities, where
communities are both more traditional and cohesive. Overall, however, the
ﬁnding conforms to the expectations in social-movement theory that a larger
population brings greater mobilisational capacity: large, urban municipalities
have a better infrastructure that may more easily lend itself to political
mobilisation of subgroups, whereas in small, rural municipalities, the costs
of forming, competing and possibly working for a political organisation may
be too high. In contrast, the participation index itself is not a signiﬁcant factor,
possibly due to very low variance in the measure across municipalities.13
Second, and more strikingly, municipal efﬁcacy affects the probability of
ethnic party presence negatively. That is, the better a municipal administration
is run, the less likely is the emergence of an ethnic party. The model hence
conﬁrms the expectations of the social-movement approach in this regard, too.
One may object that the causal direction is indeed the other way around:
that municipalities are administered inefﬁciently precisely when the indigenous
population is politically mobilised because efﬁcient decision-making is more
difﬁcult in ethnically diverse polities, where group interests tend to diverge.
If that were the case, maladministration should increase when indigenous in-
terests are formally represented in the municipal councils following the 2004
elections. However, we have already seen that there is no signiﬁcant difference
between maladministration scores of municipalities in which ethnic parties
attained enough votes to enter government, and hence to affect policy accord-
ingly, and those in which they did not. The same holds for changes in malad-
ministration scores until 2009, the end of municipal government tenure; if
anything, maladministration decreased more strongly in the former than the
latter (see note 9).
Robustness checks
To test the analysis for spurious correlations, I ran several robustness checks
besides those already reported in the endnotes (see Table A1a, online appen-
dix). First, one may argue that in addition to the perceived beneﬁt of holding
ofﬁce, political actors may need to perceive a certain degree of spending
discretion over these revenues. Here, we can use again the municipal malad-
ministration indices as indication to actors to what extent they may be able
to divert funds for their personal beneﬁt. Yet adding maladministration to
the instrumental model does not change the coefﬁcients, and even decreases
model ﬁt (AIC = 316.61).
Second, revenues per capita may not perfectly capture actors’ expected
beneﬁts of ofﬁce. I hence examined three further indicators for such beneﬁts,
collected by Faguet (2012) for the years 1994–6. Two variables indicate
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municipal wealth: the total local tax and non-tax revenues and the municipal
government’s total assets. The third measures direct personal beneﬁts through
a councillor’s salary. When included in the instrumental model, neither of
these variables are signiﬁcant, further conﬁrming that personal beneﬁts of
ofﬁce are not the driving factor in the formation of ethnic parties in Bolivia.14
Third, to better reﬂect the theoretical assumptions of the different
approaches, I only examined two separate models. One may speculate that
the effect of grievances disappears when including measures for ofﬁce-seeking
incentives such as revenues per capita. However, adding these to the social-
movement model does not result in any changes: the highland population
share, the population size and grievances remain signiﬁcant, but the model
ﬁt worsens (AIC = 300.07).
Fourth, I tested the possibility that ethnic party formation is, at least partly,
a function of between-municipality collaboration of indigenous networks
rather than of within-municipality considerations by including department
dummies in the models (Table A1b). Doing so does not substantively change
the results presented above: the social-movement model remains better ﬁtting
(Vuong’s p = 0.027) and grievances remain signiﬁcant (p < 0.001).
Fifth, while the measures of ethnic group size are derived directly from the
literature on ethnic parties, rational-choice inspired research on ethnic politics
more generally has focused on the number, fractionalisation or polarisation of
ethnic groups (Huber 2012). I therefore also ran models including these
measures instead of group share (Table A1c). When comparing these alterna-
tive instrumental models to the original social-movement model, the latter’s
model ﬁt does remain signiﬁcantly better. And when including the alternative
measures in the social-movement model – although they do not tend to be
theorised accordingly in the literature – grievances remain signiﬁcant, too.
Sixth, previous research in other countries suggests that different local dy-
namics affect whether only one or more than one ethnic party is present
(Bochsler 2012). I therefore ran the same models with a multinomial instead
of a binomial logistic regression, with none, one and more than one ethnic
party as the dependent variable (Table A2). Again, the results do not change
substantively – grievances remain an important factor.
But do grievances explain the formation of ethnic parties or indeed the
formation of all new parties, whether ethnic or not? I tested this possibility
with a model for non-ethnic party entry as dependent variable, keeping all
other variables the same (Table A3). Here, only population size as well as
revenues per capita in the instrumental model arise as explanatory factors;
the grievances index is not signiﬁcant.
Conclusion
A variety of studies has examined the link between ethnicity and politics, often
with underlying assumptions on the location of and motives for agency. This
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paper has collected and made explicit these assumptions and tested them with
new data from the Bolivian municipal elections in 2004. While the size of the
respective ethnic group is related to ethnic party formation, the underlying
logic here does not seem to be based on the electoral calculations on the part
of ethnic entrepreneurs – an assumption underlying the instrumental
approach. Neither are ofﬁce-seeking incentives driving ethnic party formation,
whether in the form of revenues or personal salary. In contrast, grievances with
the current administration, as postulated by the social-movement approach,
do contribute to ethnic party formation, over and above ethnic group size
and other contextual factors such as the population size of the polity. The ﬁnd-
ings suggest that individual leaders have a stronger agency in party formation
than often assumed in social-movement approaches, but that they are not as
strongly driven by their own individual interests as often assumed in instru-
mental approaches.
Although this paper does not directly examine the MAS and MIP, as
detailed earlier, the ﬁndings do align with qualitative accounts of their forma-
tion (e.g. van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005). The MAS arose from the coca farmers’
movement, which increasingly drew on frames of indigenous tradition and
cultural and religious freedom in their defence against government drug
eradication programmes. While most coca farmers had indigenous
backgrounds, the organisation only became explicitly ‘ethnic’ and turned into
a party in response to grievances against the government. The MIP similarly
grew out of peasant and labour mobilisation, but adopting a more radical
indigenous discourse than the MAS.
The methodological design of the study has several advantages over other
studies: the focus on sub-national variation reduces the noise often found in
cross-country analyses, since the general context is kept constant and the
different indicators are measured in identical ways. The choice of Bolivia
was not only useful for the condition of political upheaval, which allowed
analysing ethnic party formation indeed as ﬁrst-time entry rather than through
continued performance, but also because its most-likely character for the pres-
ence of both instrumental and social-movement dynamics lends strength to
ﬁnding their absence. At the same time, the available indicators cannot always
clearly distinguish between the two approaches; arguments may be made to
include any in both models. While I conducted numerous robustness checks
with different data and speciﬁcations, more reﬁned measurement (following
clearer theoretical considerations) would, as always, be desirable to strengthen
the conclusions.
Moreover, the Bolivian context comes with a set of ethnic structures and
practices that may not easily be generalised more widely. I therefore conclude
with avenues for future research to examine ethnic party formation in other
contexts. First, ethnicity in Bolivia is rather ﬂuid: whether one identiﬁes as
indigenous or mestizo depends as much on the individual socio-economic
situation as it does on the political context. While the year 2004 already saw
the revival of indigenous identity in both rhetoric and individual identiﬁcation
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(Flesken 2014), the situation may still be different from that in countries in
which ethnicity is not as ﬂuid, as in much of Eastern Europe or in South East
Asia. Here, different motivations may drive ethnic party formation, but this
remains to be established. The present paper suggests focusing more strongly
on different types of grievances rather than on ethnic structure or individual
actors’ interests alone. Second, ethnicity in Bolivia is strongly linked to
socio-economic circumstance, that is, Bolivia is a prototypical ranked society
(Gisselquist 2013; Horowitz 1985). One may argue that ethnic party formation
follows a different logic in unranked societies, as in much of sub-Saharan
Africa. Future research may test this possibility through the analysis of ethnic
party formation in unranked societies like Kenya or Tanzania.
Both the points on the ﬂuidity of ethnicity and its relationship to socio-
economic circumstance relate to the nature of ethnic parties more generally.
This paper used a minimal deﬁnition of ethnic parties, categorising only those
parties as ethnic that explicitly appeal to voters on the basis of a common
ethnic attribute, leaving open the question whether the appeal or indeed the
called-upon ethnic attributes have historical roots or are constructed on the
spot for instrumental gain. Constructivist theory aligns with either possibility
(see e.g. Chandra 2012). Focusing further research not only on different spatial
contexts but also on processes over time can shed light on the questions
whether and how ethnic parties contribute to, or are the product of, ethnicity
construction, or both. Interview or time-series survey data on motivations of
both politicians and ordinary citizens could be particularly useful here.
Finally, the paper focuses on municipal elections. While this has methodo-
logical advantages and is of substantive interest, considering that local
elections are often ‘training grounds’ for regional and national electoral scenes,
explanations of party formation in the latter likely needs to account for several
other factors. For example, inter-constituency collaboration and
organisational legacies would need to be considered. Future research may do
so through in-depth, over-time analyses of selected national-level ethnic
parties.
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Endnotes
1 For in-depth discussions of the role of political actors in the construction of ethnic cleavages,
see e.g. Chandra (2012) and Wimmer (2013).
2 In the following, all organisations registered to compete in the elections are referred to as
political organisations or parties.
3 The Bolivian context was hence chosen for analytical, rather than statistical, generalisation
(Yin 2013).
4 The scope of the paper does not allow for a more in-depth discussion of the rise of the MAS
and the MIP. However, the interested reader may ﬁnd information on the topic especially in van
Cott (2005), Yashar (2005), Harten (2011), Loayza Bueno (2011) and sources cited therein.
5 The 2002 results are only available at the level of the national electoral district, which include
up to twenty-four municipalities (Bolivia 2012a). As a robustness check, I also used a municipal-
level binary indicator for the majority of MAS or MIP votes, which yielded similar results.
6 Further categories were Guaraní, Chiquitano, Mojeño, ‘other indigenous’ and ‘no indigenous’.
7 For computational purposes, the values were shifted such that the minimum value of all
municipalities is 0.
8 Due to data availability, I use the SVI as measured in 2005, that is, 1 year after the municipal elec-
tions. But since the index includes several factors unlikely to change within the span of 1 year, I expect
that it differs neither substantively nor systematically with the other variables of interest. A comparison
of SVI values from 2005 to 2009 shows that between-year differences are indeed very small.
9 Again, due to data availability, municipal efﬁcacy was measured in 2005. Though unlikely in
such a short time span, it may be that the presence of ethnic parties affected municipal efﬁcacy
rather than vice versa. This was not the case: a two-sample t-test failed to reject the null hypothesis
that the mean efﬁcacy scores of municipalities in which ethnic parties attained enough votes
(17.248) was less than those in which they did not (19.433, p = 0.151). The same holds for changes
in efﬁcacy scores until 2009, the end of municipal government tenure (p = 0.551); if anything,
efﬁcacy increased more strongly in the former (by 2.247) than the latter (by 1.309).
10 Revenues, too, were recorded in 2005. While revenue distribution changed rather quickly
between years from 2005 to 2009, this is the result of a new hydrocarbon policy put into practice
by the Morales administration from 2006; revenue redistribution before that was based on a hydro-
carbon law passed in 1996 (Mähler 2007) and should hence have been relatively stable between
2004 and 2005. I thank Annegret Kuhn for providing me with the data.
11 Note that, while a visual comparison of e.g. the Akaike Information Criteria may provide
indications of which model better ﬁts the underlying data, it does not show whether the difference
in model ﬁt is statistically signiﬁcant.
12 I ran the same models with a binary indicator of MAS or MIP majority in the 2002 elections at
the municipal level as well as continuous measures of MAS and MIP votes in the 2004 elections.
While signiﬁcance varies, effect sizes are very small and overall model ﬁt does not change.
13 The results do not changewith alternative indicators for organisational capacity like the number of
indigenous communities, campesino communities, neighbourhood councils and their combined count
(Faguet 2012). This suggests that the presence of enterprising actors, more likely in municipalities with
higher (indigenous) population counts, is more important than organisational capacity itself.
14 As not all data could be clearly matched to the municipalities, due to spatial reforms due to
several municipalities having the same names, the number of observations decreases, such that a
direct comparison of model ﬁt is not possible.
References
Achen, C. 2005. ‘Let’s put garbage-can regressions and garbage-can probits where they belong’,
Conﬂict Management and Peace Science 22: 327–339.
Anaïd Flesken20
© 2018 The Authors Nations and Nationalism published by Association for the Study of Ethnicity
and Nationalism and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Albó, X. 2002. ‘Bolivia: from Indian and campesino leaders to councillors and parliamentary dep-
uties’ in R. Sieder (ed.), Multiculturalism in Latin America. Indigenous Rights, Diversity and
Democracy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 74–102.
Allen, N. 2012. Diversity, patronage and parties. Parties and party system change in Indonesia.
PhD Thesis, University of British Columbia, Vancouver.
Altman, D. and Lalander, R. 2003. ‘Bolivia’s popular participation law: an undemocratic
democratisation process?’ in A. Hadenius (ed.), Decentralisation and Democratic Governance.
Experiences from India, Bolivia and South Africa. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell Interna-
tional: 63–104.
Amorim Neto, O. and Cox, G. 1997. ‘Electoral institutions, cleavage structures, and the number of
parties’, American Journal of Political Science 41: 149–174.
Benoit, K. 2002. ‘The endogeneity problem in electoral studies: a critical re-examination of
Duverger’s mechanical effect’, Electoral Studies 21: 35–46.
Bernauer, J. and Bochsler, D. 2011. ‘Electoral entry and success of ethnic minority parties in cen-
tral and eastern Europe: a hierarchical selection model’, Electoral Studies 30: 738–755.
Bilinski, A. 2015. ‘Cultural legacies and electoral performance of ethnic minority parties in post-
communist Europe’, Nations and Nationalism 21: 721–740.
Birnir, J. 2007. Ethnicity and Electoral Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Birnir, J. 2004. ‘Stabilizing party systems and excluding segments of society? The effects of forma-
tion costs on new party foundation in Latin America’, Studies in Comparative International
Development 39: 3–27.
Bochsler, D. 2012. ‘When two of the same are needed: a multilevel model of intragroup ethnic
party competition’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 18: 216–241.
Bochsler, D. and Szöcsik, E. 2013. ‘Building inter-ethnic bridges or promoting ethno-territorial de-
marcation lines? Hungarian minority parties in competition’, Nationalities Papers 41: 761–779.
Bolivia. 2001. ‘Censo 2001’, Instituto Nacional de Estadística. http://apps.ine.gob.bo/censo/en-
trance.jsp. (Accessed 1 June 2015).
Bolivia. 2004a. ‘Ley No 2771: Ley de Agrupaciones Ciudadanas y Pueblos Indígenas’, Congreso
Nacional de Bolivia, 7 July 2004.
Bolivia. 2004b. ‘Municipales 2004: Consulta Candidatos Concejales’, Corte Nactional Electoral,
http://190.129.76.45/consultamun4/consulta_concejal.aspx. (Accessed 14 October 2014).
Bolivia 2009. Estado de Situación Sociodemográﬁca de los Municipios en Bolivia: Periodo
2005–2009. La Paz: Editora PRESENCIA.
Bolivia 2010. Índice de Gobernabilidad Municipal 2005–2009. La Paz: PGD Impresiones.
Bolivia 2012a. Atlas Electoral de Bolivia, Tomo I: Elecciones Generales 1979–2009 y Asamblea
Constituyente 2006. La Paz: SPC Impresores S.A.
Bolivia 2012b. ‘Transferencias a los Gobiernos Municipales 2005–2011’ inMinisterio de Economía
y Finanzas Públicas. La Paz: Unidad de Gestión Presupuestaria y Presupuesto Plurinacional.
Brancati, D. 2006. ‘Decentralization: fueling the ﬁre or dampening the ﬂames of ethnic conﬂict and
secessionism?’ International Organization 60: 651–683.
CERD 2006. Compilación de Observaciones Finales del Comité para la Eliminación de la
Discriminación Racial Sobre Países de América Latina y el Caribe 1970–2006. Santiago: CEPAL.
Cerrón-Palomino, R. 2015. ‘Aymara’ in G. Urton, A. von Hagen (eds.), Encyclopedia of the Incas.
Lanham: Rowman and Littleﬁeld: 49–50.
Chandra, K. 2004. Why Ethnic Parties Succeed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chandra, K. 2011. ‘What is an ethnic party?’ Party Politics 17: 151–169.
Chandra, K. (ed.) 2012.Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics. NewYork: OxfordUniversity Press.
Clark, W. and Golder, M. 2006. ‘Rehabilitating Duverger’s theory: testing the mechanical and
strategic modifying effects of electoral laws’, Comparative Political Studies 39: 679–708.
Clarke, K. 2001. ‘Testing nonnested models of international relations: reevaluating realism’,
American Journal of Political Science 45: 724–744.
Conroy-Kurtz, J. 2012. ‘Information and ethnic politics in Africa’, British Journal of Political
Science 43: 345–373.
Why ethnic parties form 21
© 2018 The Authors Nations and Nationalism published by Association for the Study of Ethnicity
and Nationalism and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Cox, G. 1997. Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Do Alto, H. 2008. ‘El MAS-IPSP Boliviano, Entre Movimiento Social y Partido Político’, Análisis
Político 62: 25–43.
Dunning, T. and Harrison, L. 2010. ‘Cross-cutting cleavages and ethnic voting: an experimental
study of cousinage in Mali’, American Political Science Review 104: 21–39.
Duverger, M. 1954. Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State.
Methuen: Wiley.
ECLAC 2006. Social Panorama of Latin America. Santiago: ECLAC.
Eisinger, P. 1973. ‘The conditions of protest behavior in American cities’, American Political
Science Review 67: 11–28.
Erlingsson, G. 2008. ‘The spatial diffusion of party entrepreneurs in Swedish local politics’,
Political Geography 27: 857–874.
Faguet, J.-P. 2012. Decentralization and Popular Democracy: Governance from Below in Bolivia.
University of Michigan Press. http://governancefrombelow.net (accessed June 30, 2017).
Ferree, K. 2011. Framing the Race in South Africa: The Political Origins of Racial-Census
Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Flesken, A. 2013. ‘Ethnicity without group: dynamics of indigeneity in Bolivia’, Nationalism and
Ethnic Politics 19: 333–353.
Flesken, A. 2014. ‘On the link between ethnic politics and identiﬁcation: lessons from Bolivia’,
Ethnopolitics 13: 159–180.
Garcia, M. 2003. ‘The politics of community: education, indigenous rights, and ethnic mobiliza-
tion in Peru’, Latin American Perspectives 30: 70–95.
Gisselquist, R. 2013. ‘Ethnic politics in ranked and unranked systems: an exploratory analysis’,
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 19: 381–402.
Harten, S. 2011. The Rise of Evo Morales and the MAS. London: Zed Books.
Horowitz, D. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conﬂict. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Huber, J. 2012. ‘Measuring ethnic voting: do proportional electoral laws politicize ethnicity?’
American Journal of Political Science 56: 986–1001.
Hug, S. 2001. Altering Party Systems: Strategic Behavior and the Emergence of New Political
Parties in Western Democracies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Ishiyama, J. 2009. ‘Do ethnic parties promote minority ethnic conﬂict?’ Nationalism and Ethnic
Politics 15: 56–83.
Ishiyama, J. and Breuning, M. 2011. ‘What’s in a name? Ethnic party identity and democratic
development in post-communist politics’, Party Politics 17: 223–241.
Jones, M. 1997. ‘Racial heterogeneity and the effective number of candidates in majority runoff
elections: evidence from Louisiana’, Electoral Studies 16: 349–358.
Kitschelt, H. 1986. ‘Political opportunity structures and political protest: anti-nuclear movements
in four democracies’, British Journal of Political Science 16: 57–85.
Lago, I. and Martínez, F. 2011. ‘Why new parties?’ Party Politics 17: 3–20.
Lago Penas, I. 2004. ‘Cleavages and thresholds: the political consequences of electoral laws in the
Spanish autonomous communities 1980–2000’, Electoral Studies 23: 23–43.
Loayza Bueno, R. 2011. Eje del MAS: Ideología, Representación Social y Mediación en Evo
Morales Ayma. La Paz: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
Madrid, R. 2012. The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Mähler, A. 2007. ‘Bolivianische Erdgaspolitik im Wandel’, Lateinamerika Analysen 16: 125–148.
Mähler, A. and Pierskalla, J. 2015. ‘Indigenous identity, natural resources, and contentious politics in
Bolivia: a disaggregated conﬂict analysis, 2000–2011’, Comparative Political Studies 48: 301–332.
Morris, A. and Staggenborg, S. 2006. ‘Leadership in socialmovements’ inD. Snow, S. Soule, H.Kriesi
(eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing: 171–196.
Moser, R. 1999. ‘Electoral systems and the number of parties in postcommunist states’, World
Politics 51: 359–384.
Anaïd Flesken22
© 2018 The Authors Nations and Nationalism published by Association for the Study of Ethnicity
and Nationalism and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Mozaffar, S., Scarritt, J. and Galaich, G. 2003. ‘Electoral institutions, ethnopolitical cleavages, and
party systems in Africa’s emerging democracies’, American Political Science Review 97: 379–390.
Opp, K.-D. 2009. Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements: A Multidisciplinary
Introduction, Critique, and Synthesis. London: Routledge.
Posner, D. 2005. Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Rabushka, A. and Shepsle, K. 1972. Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory in Democratic Instability.
Columbia: C. Merrill.
Rice, R. and van Cott, D. 2006. ‘The emergence and performance of indigenous peoples’ parties in
south America: a subnational statistical analysis’, Comparative Political Studies 39: 709–732.
Singer, M. and Morrison, K. 2004. ‘The 2002 presidential and parliamentary elections in Bolivia’,
Electoral Studies 23: 172–182.
Tavits, M. 2006. ‘Party system change: testing a model of new party entry’, Party Politics 12:
99–119.
Toranzo Roca, C. 2008. ‘Let the mestizos stand up and be counted’ in J. Crabtree, L. Whitehead
(eds.), Unresolved Tensions. Bolivia Past and Present. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press:
35–50.
van Cott, D. 2005. From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vuong, Q. 1989. ‘Likelihood ratio tests for model selection and non-nested hypotheses’,
Econometrica 57: 307–333.
Weber, A., Hiers, W. and Flesken, A. 2016. Politicized Ethnicity: A Comparative Perspective. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Wimmer, A. 2013. Ethnic Boundary Making: Institutions, Networks, Power. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Yashar, D. 2005. Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and
the Postliberal Challenge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Yin, R. 2013. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Zuber, C. 2013. ‘Beyond outbidding? Ethnic party strategies in Serbia’, Party Politics 19: 758–777.
Supporting information
Additional Supporting Information may be found online in the supporting
information tab for this article.
Why ethnic parties form 23
© 2018 The Authors Nations and Nationalism published by Association for the Study of Ethnicity
and Nationalism and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
